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On the decidability of the Σ2 theories of the arithmetic
and hyperarithmetic degrees as uppersemilattices
James Barnes
Abstract
We establish the decidability of the Σ2 theory of both the arithmetic and hyper-
arithmetic degrees in the language of uppersemilattices i.e. the language with ≤, 0 and
⊔. This is achieved by using Kumabe-Slaman forcing - along with other known results
- to show that given finite uppersemilattices M and N , where M is a subuppersemi-
lattice of N , then for both degree structures, every embedding ofM into the structure
extends to one of N iff N is an end-extension of M.
Introduction
Given a transitive notion r of reducibility between subsets of ω (we write X ≤r Y to mean X
is r-reducible to Y ), the r degrees (denoted Dr) is the quotient of 2
ω under the equivalence
relation ≡r of mutual reducibility: X ≡r Y iff X ≤r Y and Y ≤r X . The relation ≤r induces
a partial order on Dr, and given X ⊆ ω, we call its equivalence class in Dr its r degree. The
primary such notion is Turing reducibility: X ≤T Y if there is a Turing machine with oracle
Y that computes the characteristic function of X .
Two related notions are arithmetic and hyperarithmetic reducibility (denoted ≤a and
≤h respectively). We say X is arithmetic in Y if X is Turing reducible to the nth jump of
Y for some n ∈ ω (the jump Y ′ of Y is the set {e : {e}Y (e) ↓}, the nth jump is the nth
iterate of the jump operator). Equivalently, X is arithmetic in Y if is definable in first-order
arithmetic with a predicate for membership in Y . X is hyperarithmetic in Y if X is Turing
reducible to the αth jump of Y for some Y -recursive ordinal α (at limit levels one takes
effective unions). Equivalently, X is hyperarithmetic in Y if X is ∆11 in Y in second-order
arithmetic.
The three degree structures DT ,Da,Dh all have a least element: the degree of the empty
set. Furthermore, each has a natural join operator induced by the operation ⊕ on 2ω, which
is defined by
X ⊕ Y = {2n : n ∈ X} ∪ {2n+ 1 : n ∈ Y }.
It is easy to check that the degree of X⊕Y depends only on the degree of X and Y , and that
it is their least upperbound. The reducibility, the 0 degree, and the join operator endow each
of these classes of degrees with the structure of an uppersemilattice with 0. (We abbreviate
this as USL).
1
1 Preliminaries
A major project in recursion theory has been to classify the dividing line between the decid-
able and undecidable fragments of the theories of degree structures in various languages. In
this paper we extend the result of Jockusch and Slaman [3] that the Σ2 theory of DT as a
USL is decidable, to Da and Dh. This is sharp, in the sense that the Σ3 theory of all three
structures is undecidable, even with only ≤ in the language. This follows for any USL L
into which every finite USL embeds as an initial segment. The result is originally due to
Schmerl for DT , see Lerman - Thm VII.4.5 [5] for a proof. For the initial segment results in
Da and Dh, see Simpson [10], and Kjos-Hanssen and Shore [4] respectively.
Our approach follows that of Jockusch and Slaman, who showed that given a USL L ,
the Σ2 theory of L is decidable if the following three facts obtain:
(1) Every finite USL embeds as an initial segment of L .
(2) For every x ∈ L and n > 0 there are y0, . . . , yn ∈ L which are mutually incomparable
over x (i.e. for each i = 0, . . . , n the points yi and x⊔
⊔
j 6=i yj are incomparable in L ).
(3) For any a, b, ci, di, ei ∈ L ,[∧
i∈ω
di  ci& (a  ci or di  ci ⊔ b)
]
→ (∃g)
[
b ≤ a ⊔ g&
∧
i∈ω
di  ci ⊔ g&
∧
i∈ω
g  ei
]
We call (3) the extended Posner-Robinson theorem for L (for the decidability result,
one actually only needs the above to hold for arbitrarily long finite conjunctions, which is
slightly weaker than allowing countable conjunctions).
The analogues of (1) and (2) both hold in Da and Dh. Citations for (1) were given
above, (2) follows by taking the columns of a sufficiently generic Cohen real (relativied to
a suitable degree). (See Odifreddi [6] for an exposition of arithmetical Cohen forcing, and
Sacks IV.3 [7] for hyperarithmetical Cohen forcing). Thus, the question of the decidability
of the Σ2 theory of Da and Dh can be resolved by establishing the extended Posner-Robinson
theorem for these structures. The rest of this paper is devoted to showing that this is indeed
the case.
Our method is a forcing construction, however, is different from that of Jockush and
Slaman. They devise a forcing, depending on representatives A ∈ a and B ∈ b, coding B(n)
into the top element of the nth column of their generic g. This renders B ≤T g′, and so
B is both arithmetic and hyperarithmetic in g. If there are (arithmetic or hyperarithmetic)
degrees ci,di such that di ≤ ci ⊔ b and a  ci, then di ≤ ci ⊔ g, and so such a forcing does
not suffice in our settings.
Instead, we use Kumabe-Slaman forcing, in particular, the presentation given in Shore
and Slaman [9]. In the hyperarithmetic setting we also have the added concern of preserving
ωci1 for each ci.
2
2 The notion and language of forcing
Definition 2.1 (Turing functionals). For x ∈ ω, y ∈ {0, 1}, and σ ∈ 2<ω, we call the tuple
〈x, y, σ〉 an axiom or a computation. A Turing functional is a set Φ of computations
such that, if σ1 and σ2 are compatible, and 〈x, y1, σ1〉, 〈x, y2, σ2〉 ∈ Φ, then y1 = y2 and
σ1 = σ2.
Furthermore, Φ is use-monotone if,
• whenever σ1 ( σ2 and 〈x1, y1, σ1〉, 〈x2, y2, σ2〉 ∈ Φ, then x1 < x2, and
• whenever x1 < x2 and 〈x2, y2, σ2〉 ∈ Φ, there is a y1 and a σ1 ( σ2 such that
〈x1, y1, σ1〉 ∈ Φ.
Notation. We write Φ(x, σ) = y to mean there is a τ ⊆ σ such that 〈x, y, τ〉 ∈ Φ. If X ⊆ ω,
we write Φ(x,X) = y to mean there is an n such that Φ(x,X ↾ n) = y, and write Φ(X) for
the (partial) function evaluated in this way. Note that Φ(X) is (uniformly) recursive in the
join of X and Φ.
Definition 2.2 (Kumabe-Slaman forcing). Kumabe-Slaman forcing is the partial order
P, with conditions p = (Φp,Xp), where Φp is a finite use-monotone Turing functional and
Xp is a finite set of subsets of ω (hereafter we refer to such X ⊆ ω as reals). For elements
p, q of P, we say q ≤P p (q extends p) if
• Φp ⊆ Φq and for all (xq, yq, σq) ∈ Φq \ Φp and all 〈xp, yp, σp〉 ∈ Φp the length of σq is
greater than the length of σp.
• Xp ⊆ Xq.
• For every x, y, and X ∈ Xp, if Φq(X)(x) = y, then Φp(X)(x) = y i.e. q can’t add new
axioms 〈x, y, σ〉 where σ ⊂ X for any X ∈ Xp.
We think of a forcing condition p = (Φp,Xp) as approximating a (possibly nonrecursive)
Turing functional ΦG. To a descending sequence of conditions (pn)
∞
n=1 we associate the object
ΦG =
⋃
nΦpn , a use-monotone Turing functional.
On a formal level, we code each finite use-monotone Turing functional Φ as a nat-
ural number, which encodes each element of Φ and also the size of Φ. For instance,
given some recursive encoding of triples 〈x, y, σ〉 as positive integers, we could code Φ =
{〈x1, y1, σ1〉, . . . , 〈xn, yn, σn〉} as the product
∏n
i=1 P (i)
〈xi,yi,σi〉 where P (i) is the ith prime.
Consequently, a forcing condition is coded as a pair, the first coordinate is a natural number
and the second a finite set of reals. We dub the first coordinate the finite part, and the
second the infinite part. Given finite use-monotone Turing functionals Φp and Φq, we will
occasionally abuse notation and write Φp ≤P Φq, by which we mean (Φp, ∅) ≤P (Φq, ∅).
We will often have occasion to modify our notion of forcing somewhat, either by insisting
that certain axioms don’t belong to the finite part, or the reals can only come from a
particular subclass of 2ω. For the first modification we introduce some notation:
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Notation. Given reals A and B (think of representatives from a and b respectively), we
say that a Turing functional Φ partially computes B on input A if whenever Φ(A)(n)
is defined, it equals B(n). More explicitly, if 〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ Φ is an axiom such that σ ⊆ A (we
say this axiom applies to A), then y = B(x).
Definition 2.3 (Restricted Kumabe-Slaman forcing). QA,B is the subset of P containing all
those conditions q = (Φq,Xq) such that Φq partially computes B on input A, and Xq does
not contain A. Extension in QA,B (denoted ≤QA,B) is defined as for P. The partial order
QA,B is a suborder of P, and will be abbreviated as Q if it is understood what A and B are.
We employ a similar convention as for P and write Φq ≤Q Φr to mean (Φq, ∅) ≤Q (Φr, ∅).
Our main goal is to construct a sufficiently generic sequence of conditions into which we
code B via A. More precisely, for each n ∈ ω, our generic will have an axiom (n,B(n), α)
where α is an initial segment of A. This will ensure that ΦG(A) is the characteristic function
of B, and so B ≤T ΦG ⊕A. We will need to show that we can construct a generic sequence
without adding “incorrect” axioms applying to A, and without adding A into the infinite
part of any condition (which would prevent us from adding any axioms about A later).
The forcing QA,B has all this hard-wired in, however, it is at the expense of checking
whether Φ can serve as the finite part of the condition being A ⊕ B recursive, instead of
plain old recursive. For P, we need to show that we can manually avoid adding in bad
axioms or A into the infinite part of a condition, while still constructing a generic sequence.
We ensure that di  ci ⊔ g via genericity. At a high level, our method is quite standard,
we will define a forcing language that will be powerful enough to express all the possible
pertinent reductions from Ci ⊕ ΦG to Di (for chosen representatives Ci ∈ ci and Di ∈ di).
We will try to diagonalize against each of these reductions in turn. The result for the
arithmetic degrees is a direct corollary of our methods for the hyperarithmetic degrees, so
we need not treat them separately.
For forcing in the arithmetic or Turing degrees, a forcing language based upon first-
order arithmetic often suffices. However, for the hyperarithmetic setting something more
expressive is required. We use recursive infinitary formulas as presented in Ash and Knight
chapter 9 [1] (over the language of arithmetic, see Shore [8] for an exposition). Roughly
speaking, at the ground level we have the quantifier-free finitary sentences in our language,
and then, for each recursive ordinal α, a Σrα formula is an r.e. disjunction of the form∨
i
(∃~ui)ψi(~ui, ~x)
where each ψi is a Π
r
βi
formula for some βi < α. Similarly a Π
r
α formula is an r.e. conjunction
of universally quantified formulas all of which are Σrβi for some βi < α.
Definition 2.4 (The language of forcing). We start with L, the set containing the following
nonlogical symbols:
• Numerals: 0, 1, 2, . . ..
4
• A 5-ary relation for the universal recursive predicate: ϕ(e, x, s, y, σ) (to be interpreted
as, the eth Turing machine on input x running for s steps with oracle σ halts, and
outputs y, we will often write this as {e}σs (x) ↓= y, and write {e}
X(x) for the partial
function evaluated this way).
• A predicate for a string being an initial segment of our generic: σ ⊂ ΦG
From L we build up the recursive infinitary formulas as indicated in Ash and Knight, with
the convention that the ground level formulas are in CNF, and denote this collection Lrω1,ω.
To relativise to some S ⊆ ω, we add a predicate (written σ ⊂ S) for a string being an
initial segment of S, and build up the S-recursive infinitary formulas i.e. we allow S-r.e.
infinitary conjunctions and disjunctions. We denote the collection of such formulas Lrω1,ω(S)
and rank the formulas as Σrα(S) and Π
r
α(S) for α < ω
S
1 .
We think of numerals as having a dual role in our language: they represent both numbers
(in the obvious way) and also strings via some fixed recursive bijection between 2<ω and ω.
We will suppress the technical apparatus needed, and will use lowercase Roman letters when
we are thinking in terms of numbers, and lowercase Greek letters when we are thinking in
terms of strings.
We can now define the forcing relation P for P, with some S ⊆ ω as our set parameter.
Definition 2.5 (The forcing relation). The relation P between elements of P and sentences
of Lrω1,ω(S) is defined by induction on the ordinal rank and complexity of the formula.
(1) p P n = m iff n = m.
(2) p P ϕ(e, x, s, y, σ) iff {e}σs (x) ↓= y.
(3) p P σ ⊂ S iff σ ⊂ S.
(4) p P σ ⊂ ΦG iff for all n less than |σ|:
(a) If σ(n) = 1, then n ∈ Φp.
(b) If σ(n) = 0, then either n is not of the form 〈x, y, τ〉, or n = 〈x, y, τ〉, n /∈ Φp and
(i) there is an 〈x0, y0, τ0〉 ∈ Φp such that |σ0| is greater than |σ|, or, x0 is greater
than x and σ0 is compatible with σ, or
(ii) σ is an initial segment of one of the elements of Xp.
(5) For an atomic sentence ψ, p P ¬ψ iff there is no q ≤P p with q  ψ.
(6) For sentences ψ1, . . . , ψn that are literals, p P ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψn iff for all q ≤P p there
exists an r ≤P q and an i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that r  ψi.
(7) For sentences ψ1, . . . , ψn that are finite disjunctions of literals, p P ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn iff
p  ψi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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(8) p P
∨
i
(∃~ui)ψi(~ui) iff there is some i and some ~n such that p P ψi(~n).
(9) p P
∧
i
(∀~ui)ψi(~ui) iff for each i, ~n and q ≤P p there is some r ≤P q such that r  ψi(~n).
Note. We note some abuses of the language of forcing which we will employ hereafter.
Firstly, we will stop underlining numerals. Secondly, although our language only has nega-
tions of atomic formulas, there is an S-recursive function neg that takes (an index for) a
formula ψ and returns (an index for) a formula that is logically equivalent to the negation
of ψ. Also, neg preserves the ordinal rank of the formula i.e. if ψ is Πrα(S), then neg(ψ) is
Σrα(S), and visa versa. Consequently, we write ¬ψ freely as if negation were a part of the
language.
As expected, it can be shown that, for each S-recursive ordinal α, the claim that the
partial function {e}(S⊕ΦG)
(α)
is defined on an input x (and, optionally, has value y) can be
expressed as a Σrα+1 sentence in our language, uniformly in e, x and y.
The definition of Q is analogous except in clause 4. In particular we must add a third
possibility to (b), namely, that τ ⊂ A but B(x) 6= y.
Standard lemmas include that extension preserves forcing, no condition forces a sentence
and its (formal) negation, and given a sentence and a condition, we can find an extension of
that condition deciding the sentence.
The countability of Lrω1,ω(S) implies that generic sequences exist. To a generic sequence
{pn} we associate the generic object ΦG =
⋃
Φpn, which is the intended interpretation of
ΦG. With this, one proves the final standard lemma: truth equals forcing. Proofs of these
standard lemmas can be found in chapter 10 of Ash and Knight.
Now a technical lemma about the complexity of the forcing relation.
Lemma 2.6. Given a finite use-monotone Turing functional Φ0, and a quantifier-free fini-
tary sentence ψ in Lrω1,ω(S) (i.e. a Π
r
0 sentence), we can S-recursively decide whether there
is an X such that (Φ0,X) ∈ P forces ψ, uniformly in both the sentence and the functional.
Furthermore, we can also make this decision for QA,B (and Q), however, the procedure
is uniformly recursive in A⊕ B ⊕ S.
Proof. We begin with the claim for P. By convention, finitary sentences are in conjunctive
normal form. There are four types of atomic sentences
(1) n = m
(2) ϕ(e, x, s, y, σ)
(3) σ ⊂ S
(4) σ ⊂ ΦG
then there are the negations of these atoms, finite disjunctions of such literals, and finite
conjunctions of such disjunctions.
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For the first three types of atoms, a condition forces it iff it is true, and we can recursively
in S check each of these facts. Similarly if one of these atoms is false, then no condition
forces it to be true, and so every condition forces the negation.
The fourth type of atom is σ ⊂ ΦG. We claim that there is anX so that (Φ0,X)  σ ⊂ ΦG
iff for each n < |σ|, we have Φ0(n) = σ(n) (which is uniformly recursive to check). To see this,
note that a condition p forces σ ⊂ ΦG iff σ(n) = Φp(n) and for each n such that σ(n) = 0, if
n = 〈x, y, τ〉, then 〈x, y, τ〉 is prevented from entering any extension of p (i.e. there is either
an axiom (x0, y0, τ0) ∈ Φp with |τ0| > |τ |, or x0 ≥ x and τ0 and τ are compatible, or τ is an
initial segment of some X ∈ Xp).
Therefore, for p to force σ ⊂ ΦG, it is necessary that Φp agrees with σ everywhere that
σ is defined. If Φ0 and σ do agree, then for each n < |σ| with σ(n) = 0 and n of the form
〈x, y, τ〉, we can pick a real X extending τ and let X be the collection of such reals. Then
(Φ0,X)  σ ⊂ ΦG which completes the claim.
Now we turn to literals of the form ¬(σ ⊂ ΦG). We claim that we can pick an X to
guarantee that (Φ0,X) P ¬(σ ⊂ ΦG) iff there is an n < |σ| such that σ(n) 6= Φ0(n). From
the definition of forcing, a condition p forces ¬(σ ⊂ ΦG) iff every extension of p fails to force
σ ⊂ ΦG. Suppose Φ0 and σ agree wherever σ is defined, then, by the above, we can pick X0
so that (Φ0,X0)  σ ⊂ ΦG. Therefore, for each X we have that (Φ0,X∪X0) ≤P (Φ0,X) and
(Φ0,X∪X0)  σ ⊂ ΦG. Consequently, if Φ0 and σ agree wherever σ is defined, then, for each
choice of X there is an extension of (Φ0,X) forcing σ ⊂ ΦG. By taking the contrapositive we
have established one direction of the claim.
For the other direction, suppose there is an n so that σ(n) 6= Φ0(n). For such an n, either
σ(n) = 0 and Φ0(n) = 1, or, σ(n) = 1 and Φ0(n) = 0. In the first case, no extension of
(Φ0, ∅) can force σ ⊂ ΦG as n is in every stronger condition. Hence, X = ∅ suffices as the set
of reals. In the second case, if n 6= 〈x, y, τ〉, then n is not an element of any Turing functional
and so again X = ∅ suffices. So suppose n = 〈x, y, τ〉 and let X be any real extending τ . As
〈x, y, τ〉 /∈ Φ0, it is also not in any extension of (Φ0, {X}), so no extension of this condition
can force σ ⊂ ΦG, and so, {X} is our set of reals, which completes the proof of the claim.
Now, suppose we have a sentence ψ = l1∨ · · ·∨ ln, which is a finite disjunction of literals.
From the definition of forcing, it is clear that if a condition forces one of the disjuncts, it
forces the whole disjunction. So, using induction, ask whether there is a literal li and a set of
reals X so that (Φ0,X)  li. If there is, we are done, as such an X suffices. If not, we claim
no X works. To see this, firstly, note that we get to ignore any of the literals with atomic
parts of type (1), (2) or (3), as (∅, ∅) decides these sentences as false. So now assume ψ is a
disjunction of literals built from atoms of type (4). For each positive literal σi ⊂ ΦG, because
we can’t pick an X to force it, then, Φ0 and σi disagree somewhere on the domain of σi.
Hence, for each i, there is a finite collection Xi so that (Φ0,Xi)  ¬(σi ⊂ ΦG). Similarly, for
each negative literal, as we can’t pick an X to force it, then, Φ0 and σi agree on the domain
of σi, and so, we can pick Xi so that (Φ0,Xi)  σi ⊂ ΦG.
So fix a set of reals X, and define X0 =
⋃n
i=1Xi. Then (Φ0,X0 ∪ X) ≤P (Φ0,X) yet
(Φ0,X0 ∪X) forces the opposite of each literal in ψ, i.e. forces ¬ψ. Consequently, (Φ0,X)
does not force ψ for any X.
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For conjunctions ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψm, the definition of forcing is you force the conjunction iff
you force each of the conjuncts. Inductively, ask if there are reals Xi such that (Φ0,Xi)  ψi,
if “yes” in each case, then, (Φ0,
⋃m
i=1Xi) forces each conjunct. If any of them return a “no”,
then no choice of reals can suffice for all conjuncts. This completes the decision procedure,
uniformity is clear.
For Q, only minor changes are needed. Firstly, one must check whether Φ0 correctly
computes B on input A, which is recursive in A ⊕ B. Secondly, although the definition
of Q for formulas of the form σ ⊂ ΦG is slightly different i.e. an axiom 〈x, y, σ〉 where
σ ⊂ A, yet y 6= B(x) is not a member of any Q condition, this is, again A⊕ B recursive to
check. Finally, whenever we picked a real X to prevent an axiom from entering any stronger
condition, X just had to extend some finite string, and so, need not be A. These are the
only observations needed.
Now we break the proof of the extended Posner-Robinson theorem into cases. For the
moment, imagine we are trying to do a single instance of our goal:
[d h c& (a h c or d h b ⊔ c)]→ (∃g)[b ≤h a ⊔ g&d h c ⊔ g]
for some hyperarithmetic degrees a,b, c and d. Suppose they satisfy the antecedent, then,
either a h c, or, a ≤h c and d h b⊔c. We call the former the easy case, and the latter the
hard case. Pick representatives A,B,C and D from a,b, c and d respectively, furthermore,
if we are in the hard case, ensure that A ≤T C.
3 The easy case
We now proceed with the easy case, for which we use the forcing P. While constructing our
generic, we will need to code B into the join of A and ΦG. Our coding strategy is to add
axioms 〈n,B(n), α〉 to our generic, with α ⊂ A. To ensure that this is possible, we need to
show that we can construct a generic sequence without adding A to the infinite part of any
condition, and, such that any axiom 〈x, y, σ〉 applying to A that we add to the finite part
satisfies B(x) = y.
Additionally, we need to show that a sufficiently generic sequence ensures that D h
C ⊕ ΦG. Towards this goal we use the forcing language Lrω1,ω(C). As our language can
only express reductions from some C-recursive jump of C ⊕ ΦG we must also show that ΦG
preserves ωC1 . Thus, we have three goals: coding B, diagonalizing against computing D,
and preserving ωC1 . In this section we work towards the first two goals, leaving the last for
Section 5.
Coding B into the join
Definition 3.1 ((P, C)-essential to ¬ψ over Φ0). Let Φ0 be a finite use-monotone Turing
functional and
ψ =
∧
i
(∀~ui)θi(~ui)
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a Πrα(C) sentence in L
r
ω1,ω
(C) for some α > 0.
For τ = (τ1, . . . , τn), a sequence of elements of 2
<ω all of the same length, we say that τ
is (P, C)-essential to ¬ψ over Φ0, if, for all p ∈ P, all i, and all ~m of the correct length,
if p is a condition such that p <P (Φ0, ∅), and p P ¬θi(~m), then, Φp \ Φ0 includes a triple
〈x, y, σ〉 such that σ is compatible with at least one component of τ .
Definition 3.2 (TP,C(Φ0, ψ, k)). For each finite use-monotone Turing functional Φ0, each
Πrα(C) sentence ψ of our forcing language with α > 0, and each natural number k, let
TP,C(Φ0, ψ, k) be the set of length k vectors of binary strings all of the same length that are
(P, C)-essential to ¬ψ over Φ0.
We drop the (P, C) prefix or subscript where confusion will not arise (as in the rest of
this section, where we have fixed C and are only dealing with P).
We order T (Φ0, ψ, k) by extension on all coordinates. Being essential is closed downward
in this order. This endows T (Φ0, ψ, k) with the structure of a subtree of the length k vectors
of binary sequences of equal length, so T (Φ0, ψ, k) is a subtree of a recursively bounded
recursive tree.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose that Φ0 is a finite use-monotone Turing functional, ψ is a Π
r
α(C)
sentence in our forcing language with α > 0, and k is a natural number.
(1) If there is a size k set X of reals such that (Φ0,X)  ψ(ΦG), then T (Φ0, ψ, k) is infinite.
(2) If T (Φ0, ψ, k) is infinite then it has an infinite path Y . Further, each such Y is naturally
identified with a size k set X(Y ) of reals such that (Φ0,X(Y ))  ψ(ΦG).
Proof. For the first claim, let X be such a set and let (X1, . . . , Xk) be an enumeration of it,
further, let τ l denote (X1 ↾ l, . . . , Xk ↾ l). We show that each τ l ∈ T (Φ0, ψ, k), proving the
tree is infinite.
Suppose (∀~ui)θi(~ui) is one of the conjuncts that makes up ψ, ~m is the same length as ~ui,
and p ≤P (Φ0, ∅) forces ¬θi(~m), so consequently, p  ¬ψ. As p forces ¬ψ and (Φ0,X) forces
ψ, these two conditions are incompatible in P, and as p ≤P (Φ0, ∅) there must be an axiom
〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ Φp which is forbidden from entering any extension of (Φ0,X). But then, σ is an
initial segment of some Xi ∈ X and so, σ is compatible with the corresponding component
of τ l, showing τ l is essential.
For the second claim, suppose T (Φ0, ψ, k) is infinite. As it is a subtree of a finitely
branching tree, Ko¨nig’s lemma provides an infinite path Y through it. To each such Y ,
associate X(Y ), the componentwise union of the coordinates of the members of Y . This will
be a size k set of reals. We claim (Φ0,X(Y )) forces ψ for each such Y .
Suppose p < (Φ0, ∅), and there is an i and an ~m such that p  ¬θi(~m). Then there is
an axiom 〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ Φp \ Φ0 where σ is compatible with some component of each element
of Y . In particular, for sufficiently large elements of Y , σ is an initial segment of such a
component and so is an initial segment of some X ∈ X(Y ). So then, p does not extend
(Φ0,X(Y )). Therefore, no extension of (Φ0,X(Y )) forces ¬θi(~m) for any i and ~m and as
each extension of (Φ0,X(Y )) has a further extension deciding θi(~m), by the definition of
forcing, (Φ0,X(Y ))  ψ.
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Notation. For a set S ⊂ ω, we say a decision procedure or property of natural numbers
is Π0α(S) for an S-recursive ordinal α > 0, if the set of solutions to the procedure or the
property, respectively, is co-r.e. in S(α) for α ≥ ω, and co-r.e. in S(α−1) for finite α. We say
it is ∆0α(S) if it and its complement are both Π
0
α(S). For example a Π
0
1(S) set is co-r.e. in
S but a Π0ω+1(S) set is co-r.e. in S
ω+1.
Lemma 3.4. For each finite use-monotone Turing functional Φ0, each Π
r
α(C) sentence ψ
with α > 0, and each number k, T (Φ0, ψ, k) is Π
0
α(C) uniformly in Φ0, ψ and k.
Proof. Fix a length k vector τ of binary strings of the same length. Recall that τ is essential
to ¬ψ over Φ0 if for all p = (Φp,Xp) <P (Φ0, ∅), all conjuncts (∀~u)θi(~u) which make up ψ,
and all ~m of the correct length, if p  ¬θi(~m), then Φp \Φ0 contains an axiom 〈x, y, σ〉 where
σ is compatible with some component of τ .
We can express this, equivalently, as
For all Φp ≤P Φ0, all ~m of the correct length, and all conjuncts (∀~u)θi(~u) which
make up ψ, if there exists a set X such that (Φp,X)  ¬θi(~m), then Φp \ Φ0
contains an axiom 〈x, y, σ〉 where σ is compatible with some component of τ .
Or more compactly as
(∀Φp)(∀~m)(∀i)[((Φp, ∅) ≤P (Φ0, ∅) & (∃X)(Φp,X)  ¬θi(~m))
→ ((∃〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ Φp \ Φ0) with σ compatable with some τ ∈ τ )].
We can also “quantify out” the size of the set X, as
(∀Φp)(∀~m)(∀j)(∀i)[((Φp, ∅) ≤P (Φ0, ∅) & (∃X, |X| = j)(Φp,X)  ¬θi(~m))
→ ((∃〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ Φp \ Φ0) with σ compatable with some τ ∈ τ )].
We use both of these formulations in an inductive proof of this lemma, the first in the base
case, and the second in the inductive steps. Note that in both cases, the (∀i) is a quantifier
over a C-r.e. set: the conjuncts making up ψ. This is still equivalent to a single universal
quantifier.
Suppose α = 1. In this case, for each i and ~m of the correct length ¬θi(~m) is a quantifier-
free sentence. So, by Lemma 2.6, deciding whether there is an X such that (Φp,X)  ¬θi(~m)
is uniformly C-recursive in Φp, θi and ~m. Also, checking whether Φp ≤P Φ0 and whether
there is an axiom 〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ Φp \ Φ0 compatible with some τ ∈ τ is uniformly recursive in
Φ0,Φp and τ .
Consequently, in the case α = 1, τ being essential to ¬θ over Φ0 can be expressed as a
property with two universal natural number quantifiers, then a universal quantifier over a C-
r.e. set, then a matrix which is C-recursive uniformly in all parameters. Such an expression
is co-r.e. in C, or Π01(C) as required.
If α > 1 is a successor, we can assume all its conjuncts are Σrα−1(C) by Ash and Knight.
By Lemma 3.3, there being an X of size j such that (Φp,X)  ¬θi(~m) is equivalent to
T (Φp,¬θi(~m), j) being infinite. But T (Φp,¬θi(~m), j) is, by induction, a Π0α(C) subtree of
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a recursively bounded recursive tree. Hence, it being infinite is also a Π0α(C) fact, given
uniformly in Φp, j, θi and ~m. (This bound follows because the tree being finite is equivalent
to it being of bounded height and our trees are subtrees of recursive trees. Hence, saying
our trees is finite is equivalent to saying there is a level of a recursive tree, from which our
tree is disjoint i.e. (∃n)[for all nodes x in the recursive tree T at level n, x is not in our tree].
If our tree is Π0α(C) for some C this formula is equivalent to a Σ
0
α(C) formula, and so its
negation is Π0α(C) as required.)
Thus, for successor α, τ being essential to ¬ψ over Φ0 is equivalent to a property which we
can express with a block of universal natural number quantifiers, then a universal quantifier
over a C-r.e. set, then a Σ0α−1(C) matrix uniformly in the parameters. This renders the
property Π0α(C) as required.
For the limit case the argument is similar. The same formulation of the definition of
τ being essential works as for the successor case. However, here we have the full power
of C(α) which can decide whether recursively branching C(β)-recursive trees are infinite, for
β < α, uniformly in an index for the tree, so, C(α) can uniformly decide the matrix. The
prefix is a block of universal quantifiers, then a universal quantifier over a C-r.e. set, with
uniformly C(α)-recursive matrix, so τ being essential is uniformly co-r.e. in C(α), or Π0α(C)
as required.
Corollary 3.5. Suppose that S ⊆ ω is not ∆0α(C). Let Φ0 be a finite use-monotone Turing
functional, ψ a Πrα(C) sentence with α > 0, and k ≥ 1. If there is a size k set X of reals
such that (Φ0,X)  ψ, then there is such a set not containing S. Moreover, we can find such
an X all of whose members are recursive in C(α+1) uniformly in ψ, k and S ⊕ C(α+1).
Proof. Suppose there is a size k set X such that (Φ0,X)  ψ. By Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 the
tree T (Φ0, ψ, k) is a Π
0
α(C) subtree of a recursively bounded recursive tree which has an
infinite path. The paths form a nonempty Π0α(C) class and so there is a path Y in which S
is not recursive. Then, certainly S is not a member of X(Y ). Further, Lemma 3.3 implies
(Φ0,X(Y ))  ψ. This completes the proof of the first claim.
For the second claim, we need to find an infinite path in T (Φ0, ψ, k) on which S does not
appear, recursively in C(α+1) ⊕ S. We need C(α+1) to decide which members of T (Φ0, ψ, k)
have an infinite part of T (Φ0, ψ, k) above it, and S to decide whether a given node could pos-
sibly have an extension on which S appears. Consequently, there is an algorithm, recursive
in S⊕C(α+1), solving this problem which, searches through the tree of length k sequences of
binary strings of the same length, looking for one which disagrees with S and has an infinite
part of T (Φ0, ψ, k) above it. Once one is found, the algorithm switches to searching for any
path in T (Φ0, ψ, k) through this node. Note the uniformity in ψ and k follows from the
uniformity in the construction of T (Φ0, ψ, k).
Of course, once we have found a node each of the components of which are not compatible
with S, yet has a path through it, we never use S again in the construction. Hence, we could
externally hard code to only search for paths in T (Φ0, ψ, k) through some fixed node, and
any such path Y corresponds to reals X(Y ) which are recursive in C(α+1) (as C(α+1) is
constructing such a Y ), hence, the members of the X we build are C(α+1)-recursive although
we lose the uniformity by externally hard-coding in some information.
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Corollary 3.6. Suppose that α > 0, S is not ∆0α(C) and ψ is a Π
r
α(C) sentence. For any
condition p = (Φp,Xp) with S /∈ Xp, there is a stronger q which we can find uniformly in Φp
and S ⊕ C(α+1) ⊕Xp such that
(1) S /∈ Xq and each X ∈ Xq \Xp is recursive in C(α+1).
(2) For all x, if Φq(S)(x) is defined, then Φp(S)(x) is defined. That is, q does not add any
new computations which apply to S.
(3) Either q  ψ or there is a conjunct θi and an ~m such that q  ¬θi(~m) (and we can tell
which formula we have forced).
Proof. Fix a condition p = (Φp,Xp), and let k = |Xp|. We would like to know whether
T (Φ0, ψ, k+1) is infinite. It is a Π
0
α(C) subtree of a recursively bounded recursive tree, and
hence, this is a Π0α(C) fact. If T (Φ0, ψ, k + 1) is infinite, then Corollary 3.5 provides a path
Y through it, not containing S, each member of which is recursive in S ⊕ C(α+1). Then,
(Φp,Xp∪X(Y )) ≤P (Φp,X), (Φp,Xp∪X(Y ))  ψ, and, clearly, (2) is satisfied, as we haven’t
changed the finite part.
If T (Φ0, ψ, k + 1) is not infinite, then (enumerating X = {X1, . . . , Xk}) (X1, . . . , Xk, S)
does not provide a path through it. Consequently, for some l, (X1 ↾ l, . . . , Xn ↾ l, S ↾ l) is
not essential to ¬ψ over Φp, meaning there is a conjunct θi, numerals ~m and a condition
q = (Φq,Xq) extending (Φp, ∅) such that q P ¬θi(~m) yet, every new axiom 〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ Φq\Φp
is incompatible with each coordinate of (X1 ↾ l, . . . , Xn ↾ l, S ↾ l). In particular, there are
no new axioms applying to S, nor to any Xi ∈ X, and by Lemma 3.3 there is a j such that
T (Φq,¬θi(~m), j) is infinite.
We can find which Φq < Φp add neither any new computations applying to S, nor to
any member of Xp, recursively in S ⊕ Xp, and then, whether T (Φq,¬θi(~m), j) is infinite
recursively in C(α). Consequently, we can find such a Φq < Φp, θi, ~m and j recursively in
S⊕C(α+1)⊕Xp, (we add the extra jump because for each Φq < Φp we ask whether there exists
a θi, ~m and j such that T (Φp,¬θi(~m), j) is infinite). Once we have found such a Φq, θi, ~m and
j, applying Corollary 3.6 again, there is a size j set X with S /∈ X such that every X ∈ X
is uniformly recursive in S ⊕ C(α+1) and (Φq,X)  ¬θi(~m), therefore, (Φq,X ∪ Xp) is the
condition we want.
As A is not ∆0α(C) for any C-recursive α, we can repeatedly apply Corollary 3.6 to
construct an Lrω1,ω(C)-generic sequence in P, without adding A to the infinite part of any
condition, and without adding any axioms applying to A. Hence, we can dovetail this
construction with one which adds axioms 〈n,B(n), α〉 for some sufficiently long α ⊂ A
which effectively codes B into the join of A and ΦG. Now we proceed with showing that we
can diagonalize against C ⊕ ΦG computing D.
Diagonalizing against D
Notation. For a real S, we say 〈e, α〉 is an S-hyperarithmetic reduction, if e is an index and
α is an S-recursive ordinal. We write 〈e, α〉S for the partial function {e}S
(α)
.
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Definition 3.7 ((P, C)-Essential to splits). Let Φ0 be a finite use-monotone Turing func-
tional and 〈e, α〉 a C-hyperarithmetic reduction. For each τ , a finite sequence of binary
strings of the same length, we say τ is (P, C)-essential to 〈e, α〉-splits below Φ0 if when-
ever p, q <P (Φ0, ∅) form an 〈e, α〉-split (i.e. there is an x such that p  〈e, α〉C⊕ΦG(x) ↓=
k1, q  〈e, α〉C⊕ΦG(x) ↓= k2 and k1 6= k2) there is some new axiom 〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ Φp ∪ Φq but
not in Φ0 such that σ is compatible with some component of τ .
We let UP,C(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k) be the set of τ of length k which are (P, C)-essential to 〈e, α〉-
splits below Φ0, and consider this as a tree as before. Also, as before, we drop the P and C
when confusion won’t arise.
Lemma 3.8. Let Φ0 be a Turing functional, 〈e, α〉 a C-hyperarithmetic reduction, and k a
natural number.
• If X is a size k set of reals such that no pair p, q <P (Φ0,X) form an 〈e, α〉-split, then
U(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k) is infinite.
• If U(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k) is infinite then it has an infinite path, and each such path Y is
identified with a size k set X(Y ) such that (Φ0,X(Y )) has no 〈e, α〉-splits below it.
Proof. Let τ l = (X1 ↾ l, . . . , Xk ↾ l) whereX1, . . . , Xk enumeratesX. Suppose p, q <P (Φ0, ∅)
form an 〈e, α〉-split. As (Φ0,X) has no splits below it at least one of p and q are not
compatible with (Φ0,X). Suppose it is p which is incompatible. As p <P (Φ0, ∅), p must
have a new axiom 〈x, y, σ〉 which some Xi forbids. Hence, σ ⊂ Xi and, therefore, σ is
compatible with the ith component of τ l. Hence, every τ l is essential to 〈e, α〉-splits, and so
U(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k) is infinite.
For the second claim, suppose U(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k) is infinite. Then, Konig’s lemma provides
us a path Y , and X(Y ) is the componentwise union of Y . Suppose p, q ≤P (Φ0,X(Y ))
form an 〈e, α〉-split below (Φ0,X(Y )), then they also form a split below (Φ0, ∅). As the
elements of Y are essential, there is some new axiom 〈x, y, σ〉 in (WLOG) Φp, but not in Φ0
compatible with some component of each element of Y . Hence, σ is an initial segment of
some component of X(Y ), and so p P (Φ0,X(Y )), a contradiction.
Lemma 3.9. If Φ0 is a Turing functional, 〈e, α〉 a C-hyperarithmetic reduction, and k a
natural number then, U(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k) is Π0α+3(C) uniformly in Φ0, e, and k.
Proof. Fix Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k, and τ of length k. Then τ ∈ U(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k) if and only if τ is
essential to splits below Φ0, which is equivalent to:
(∀p, q <P (Φ0, ∅))(∀m,m1, m2)[(p  〈e, α〉
(C⊕ΦG)(m) ↓= m1
∧ q  〈e, α〉(C⊕ΦG)(m) ↓= m2
∧m1 6= m2)
→ (∃〈x, y, σ〉) such that 〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ (Φp ∪ Φq) \ Φ0
yet σ compatible with some τ ∈ τ )]
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Using a similar trick as in Lemma 3.4, we rewrite this as
(∀Φp,Φq ≤P Φ0)(∀m,m1, m2)[((∃Xp)(Φp,Xp)  〈e, α〉
(C⊕ΦG)(m) ↓= m1
∧ (∃Xq)(Φq,Xq)  〈e, α〉
(C⊕ΦG)(m) ↓= m2
∧m1 6= m2)
→ (∃〈x, y, σ〉) such that 〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ (Φp ∪ Φq) \ Φ0
yet σ compatible with some τ ∈ τ )]
But, by Lemma 3.3, we can replace
(∃Xp)
[
(Φp,Xp)  〈e, α〉
(C⊕ΦG)(m) ↓= m1
]
with
(∃j)
[
T (Φp, 〈e, α〉
C⊕ΦG(m) ↓= m1, j) is infinite
]
and make similar replacements for Φq and Xq.
Now, “〈e, α〉(C⊕ΦG)(m) ↓= m1” can be expressed as a Σrα+1(C) sentence in our forcing
language, uniformly in m,m1, e, α. So then, we would like to know whether a Π
0
α+2(C)
subtree of a recursively bounded recursive tree (have to go up one level one to get a Πr
sentence) is infinite, which is a Π0α+2(C) condition, uniformly in j,m,m1,Φp. Hence, τ
being essential to 〈e, α〉-splits below Φ0 is equivalent to a sentence with an initial block of
universals, with a conditional matrix, the antecedent of which is Π0α+2(C) and the consequent
uniformly recursive. Hence, τ being essential to 〈e, α〉-splits below Φ0 is a Πα+3(C) property.
Uniformity is clear from the analysis.
Corollary 3.10. For each finite use-monotone Turing functional Φ0, each C-hyperarithmetic
reduction 〈e, α〉, and each natural number k, if S is not ∆0α+3(C) and if there is a size k set
X such that (Φ0,X) has no 〈e, α〉-splits below it, then there is such an X not containing S.
Further, we can find such an X all of whose members are recursive in C(α+4) indeed, we can
construct X uniformly in e, k and S ⊕ C(α+4)
Proof. Suppose there is a size k set X such that (Φ0,X) has no 〈e, α〉-splits. Then, by
Lemma 3.8, U(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k) is infinite, and by Lemma 3.9 it is uniformly Π0α+3(C). By the
same argument as for Corollary 3.5, this tree has a path, Y , recursive in C(α+4), and yet,
S is not recursive in the members of the path, and consequently, S is not on the path.
Furthermore, by Lemma 3.8, the reals X(Y ) serve as the second coordinate of a condition
(Φ0,X(Y )), which has no 〈e, α〉-splits below it.
Now, for the uniform construction, we need to build a path through U(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k), a
Π0α+3(C) recursively bounded tree, and we need to make sure S is not on the path. C
(α+4)
suffices to decide which members of the tree have an infinite part of the tree above them.
Additionally S can check whether a given node has coordinates all of which disagree with S,
and as U(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k) is given uniformly in the mentioned parameters, we have the desired
uniformity.
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Corollary 3.11. Suppose p ∈ P is a forcing condition such that A /∈ Xp, and 〈e, α〉 a C-
hyperarithmetic reduction. Then, there is an extension of p which adds no new axioms apply-
ing to A and does not have A in the infinite part, which diagonalizes against 〈e, α〉C⊕ΦG = D
i.e. either forces 〈e, α〉C⊕ΦG is not total or there is an x such that it forces this computation
on x to be convergent, yet not equal to D(x).
Proof. Fix p. The expression “〈e, α〉C⊕ΦG is total” can be rendered in our forcing language
as a Πrα+2(C) sentence. Then, by Corollary 3.6, we can find a stronger condition q neither
adding A to the infinite part nor any new axioms applying to A to the finite part, deciding
this sentence. If it forces it to be false (i.e. the reduction is not total), q is the extension we
want.
Otherwise suppose q forces totality. If q has an 〈e, α〉C⊕ΦG split, then there is an r ≤P q
and an x such that r  〈e, α〉C⊕ΦG(x) ↓6= D(x). As there is an r ≤P q forcing this sentence,
then by Corollary 3.5 there is such an r which neither adds A to the infinite part, nor adds
any new computations applying to A to the finite part. Such an r is the extension we want.
Now suppose q has no such splits. Then, 〈e, α〉C⊕ΦG is determined by q. We claim we
can hyperarithmetically in C determine what set q determines this to be, and so compute
〈e, α〉C⊕ΦG (as determined by q) hyperarithmetically in C, which implies it is not D.
To see this, recall that as q = (Φq,Xq) has no splits, then there is a finite set of reals X
(still not containing A) all of whose members are recursive in C(α+4) such that q′ = (Φq,X)
also has no splits, by Corollary 3.10. Note q′ and q are compatible.
Now, for fixed x and each y and k, search for an Φr such that (Φr,X) ≤P (Φq,X),
and T (Φr, 〈e, α〉C⊕ΦG(x) ↓= y, k) is infinite. Checking the first condition is recursive in
C(α+4), and so too is the second, as, the tree is Π0α+2(C), uniformly in Φr, e, α, x, y, k, hence,
this search is C(α+4)-recursive. Once we find such a y, k we can output y as the value of
〈e, α〉C⊕ΦG(x). As q′ and q are compatible and q′ has no splits, y must be the value that q
decides for 〈e, α〉C⊕ΦG(x). We know such Φr, y, and k exist, because if they didn’t, then we
could force nonconvergence of the computation at x, contrary to hypothesis.
Thus, recursively in C(α+3) we can compute what q forces 〈e, α〉C⊕ΦG to be, and so, as D
is not hyperarithmetic in C, this computation does not compute D.
So, we have shown that we can construct a generic sequence for the easy case, while still
effecting the coding. We will postpone the proof of preservation of ωC1 until we have proved
results analogous to the above for the hard case.
4 The hard case
In the previous section, we proved results which we will apply to A and C, provided A is
not hyperarithmetic in C i.e. if we are in the easy case. In the hard case, these lemmas no
longer apply. This is the motivation for the forcing QA,B (which we abbreviate as Q in this
section), where we build into the notion of forcing the lemmas that we can’t push through
for P. Recall that, in the hard case, we choose representatives such that A ≤T C. In this
section when we say a condition forces a sentence, we mean Q.
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Note that if we are successful in our goal of coding B into the join of A and ΦG, then in
the hard case we will have
C ⊕ ΦG ≥T A⊕ ΦG ≥T B
and, consequently, C ⊕ ΦG ≥T B ⊕ C. Thus, we will attempt to preserve the fact that
B ⊕ C h D in the hard case. This requires us to use the language Lrω1,ω(B ⊕ C) as our
language of forcing for Q.
Definition 4.1 ((Q, B ⊕C)-essential to ¬ψ over Φ0). If Φ0 is a finite use-monotone Turing
functional which partially computes B given A, ψ is a Πrα(B⊕C) sentence in L
r
ω1,ω
(B⊕C),
and τ a finite tuple of binary strings, all of the same length, we say τ is (Q, B⊕C)-essential
to ¬ψ over Φ0, if, whenever q = (Φq,Xq) ∈ Q properly extends (Φ0, ∅) and q Q ¬θi(~m) for
one of the conjuncts (∀~u)θi(~u) making up ψ and some tuple ~m of the correct length, Φq \Φ0
contains an axiom 〈x, y, σ〉 such that σ is compatible with some τ ∈ τ .
We let TQ,B⊕C(Φ0, ψ, k) be the tree of essential tuples of length k, as before. We will
abuse notation and omit the subscripts of T (Φ0, ψ, k). Again, T (Φ0, ψ, k) is a subtree of a
recursively bounded recursive tree. Note that T (Φ0, ψ, k) could have branches which contain
A as the limit of one of the coordinates, meaning we can’t use that branch as the set of reals
for a Q condition. Given a path Y in the tree T (Φ0, ψ, k) (or any of our trees) and a real S
we say S does not appear on Y if S is not the limit of any of the coordinates of Y .
Lemma 4.2. Suppose that Φ0 is a finite use-monotone Turing functional which partially
computes B on input A, ψ is a Πrα(B ⊕ C) sentence with α > 0 and k is a natural number.
(1) If there is a size k set X of reals such that (Φ0,X) ∈ Q and forces ψ(ΦG), then
T (Φ0, ψ, k) has an infinite path on which A does not appear.
(2) If T (Φ0, ψ, k) has an infinite path on which A does not appear, then each such path
Y is naturally identified with a size k set X(Y ) (not containing A) of reals such that
(Φ0,X(Y )) ∈ Q and forces ψ(ΦG).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.3. For the first claim, note that, for each
l, τ l = (X1 ↾ l, . . . , Xk ↾ l) is essential (where (X1, . . . , Xk) enumerates such an X), as,
any q ∈ Q extending (Φ0, ∅) and forcing ¬θi(~m) for some conjunct (∀~u)θi(~u) making up ψ
and some ~m, must be incompatible with (Φ0,X). Consequently, there is a new axiom in Φq
applying to some member of X and so compatible with the corresponding component of τ l.
Clearly, A does not appear on the path because (Φ0,X) ∈ Q.
For the second claim, for any path Y in T (Φ0, ψ, k) on which A does not appear, X(Y ) -
the coordinatewise union of Y - may serve as the infinite part of a Q condition. Then, as in
Lemma 3.3, if q <Q (Φ0, ∅) forces ¬θi(~m) for a θi and an ~m as above, then q must contain
a new axiom compatible with some coordinate of each element of Y , and so, must apply to
some X ∈ X(Y ). Consequently, such a q does not extend (Φ0,X) and so (Φ0,X) Q ψ.
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Lemma 4.3. For each finite use-monotone Turing functional Φ0 that correctly computes B
on input A, each Πrα(B ⊕ C) sentence ψ in L
r
ω1,ω
(B ⊕ C) with α > 0, and each number k,
T (Φ0, ψ, k) is Π
0
α(B ⊕ C) uniformly in Φ0, ψ, and k.
Proof. We use the same strategy as for Lemma 3.4. Fix τ of length k, Φ0 and ψ. Then, τ
being essential to ¬ψ over Φ0 is equivalent to both of the following
(∀Φq)(∀~m)(∀i)[((Φq, ∅) ≤Q (Φ0, ∅) & (∃X)(Φq,X) Q ¬θi(~m))
→ (∃〈x, y, σ〉) such that 〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ Φq \ Φ0
yet σ is compatable with some τ ∈ τ )],
and
(∀Φq)(∀~m)(∀j)(∀i)[((Φq, ∅) ≤Q (Φ0, ∅) & (∃X, |X| = j)(Φq,X) Q ¬θi(~m))
→ (∃〈x, y, σ〉) such that 〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ Φq \ Φ0
yet σ is compatable with some τ ∈ τ )].
(Again the (∀i) is a universal quantifier over a (B ⊕ C)-r.e. set.)
Now suppose α = 1, then by Lemma 2.6, the antecedent in the first formulation is
A⊕B⊕C-recursive uniformly in Φ0,Φq, θi and ~m. As C ≥T A, we can ignore A, and then τ
being essential can be rendered as a property with two universal natural number quantifiers,
then a universal quantifier over a (B⊕C)-r.e. set, then a B⊕C-recursive matrix, uniformly
in the parameters. Hence, this is a Π01(B ⊕ C) property.
For the inductive steps, firstly, suppose α > 1 is a successor. We now consider the second
equivalent definition of τ being essential. By Lemma 4.2, “(∃X, |X| = j)(Φq,X)  ¬θi(~m)”
is equivalent to T (Φq,¬θi(~m), j) having a path on which A does not appear. We may render
this as: Does there exists a length l so that for every length l′ > l there exists a node
on the tree at level l′ each coordinate of which is not an initial segment of A? Because
T (Φq,¬θi(~m), j) is a subtree of a recursively bounded recursive tree, the second existential
quantifier is actually a bounded existential quantifier. As, by induction, T (Φq,¬θi(~m), j)
is Π0α−1(B ⊕ C) and A ≤T C so the tree having a path on which A does not appear is
Σ0α(B ⊕ C).
As this is the antecedent of a conditional, we flip to Π0α(B ⊕ C) and then our property
is expressed via an initial block of universal quantifiers, and then a Π0α(B ⊕ C) matrix, for
Π0α(B ⊕ C) as required.
Finally, suppose α > 1 is a limit. We use the second formulation of τ being essential.
Now, by induction, (B ⊕ C)(α) can (recursively) decide whether T (Φp,¬θi(~m), j) has an
infinite path on which A does not appear, for any conjunct (∀~u)θi(~u) of ψ. Consequently,
when α is a limit, the matrix of the second formulation for τ being essential is recursive in
(B ⊕ C)(α), and the prefix is a block of universals for Π0α(B ⊕ C) as required.
Corollary 4.4. Let Φ0 be a finite use-monotone Turing functional, ψ a Π
r
α(B⊕C) sentence,
and k a natural number. If there is a size k set X such that A /∈ X and (Φ0,X) Q ψ, then
we can - recursively in (B ⊕ C)(α+1) - find such an X, uniformly in ψ, k (of course, such a
set does not contain A).
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Proof. If there is such a set X, then by Lemma 4.2, T (Φ0, ψ, k) has an infinite path on which
A does not appear. By Lemma 4.3, T (Φ0, ψ, k) is a Π
0
α(B ⊕ C) subtree of a recursively
bounded recursive tree. Consequently, (B ⊕ C)(α+1) can decide membership in T (Φ0, ψ, k),
can decide whether the tree is infinite above any given node, and can decide whether any
node is incompatible with A. Thus, (B ⊕ C)(α+1) can construct a path Y in T (Φ0, ψ, k) on
which A does not appear, and then, (Φ0,X(Y )) Q ψ.
Corollary 4.5. Let ψ be a Πrα(B⊕C) sentence and k a natural number. For any condition
q ∈ Q there is a stronger r ≤Q q which we can find uniformly in Φq and (B ⊕ C)(α+2) ⊕Xq
such that every new X ∈ Xr is recursive in (B ⊕ C)(α+1), and r decides ψ (and we know
whether r Q ψ or r Q ¬ψ).
Proof. Fix a q ∈ Q and enumerate Xq as X1, . . . , Xk. There are three cases to consider:
Either T (Φq, ψ, k) has an infinite path on which A does not appear, or T (Φq, ψ, k) is finite,
or T (Φq, ψ, k) is infinite (and so has a path) but every such path contains A.
T (Φq, ψ, k) is a Π
0
α(B ⊕ C) subtree of a recursively bounded recursive tree by given
uniformly in the parameters, by Lemma 4.3. Hence, the question of T (Φq, ψ, k) being infinite
is uniformly Π0α(B ⊕ C) and so is decidable in (B ⊕ C)
(α+1). Furthermore, if it is infinite,
(B ⊕ C)(α+2) can decide whether there is a path on which A does not appear, because A is
recursive in C. Therefore, (B ⊕ C)(α+2) can uniformly determine which case we are in.
Case 1: If we find T (Φq, ψ, k) has an infinite path on which A does not appear (B⊕C)
(α+1)
suffices to construct such a path Y as in Corollary 4.4. By Lemma 4.2 (Φq,X(Y )) Q ψ and
so r = (Φq,Xq ∪X(Y )) suffices and was found uniformly.
Case 2: In this case T (Φq, ψ, k) is finite and so (X1, . . . , Xk) does not form a path through
it. Therefore, for some l, τ l = (X1 ↾ l, . . . , Xk ↾ l) is not essential to ¬ψ over Φq. Then
there is some p <Q (Φq, ∅), some conjunct θi(~u) of ψ and an ~m of the correct length such
that, p Q ¬θi(~m) yet no 〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ Φp \ Φq is compatible with any component of τ l. As
p  ¬θi(~m) there is a j such that T (Φp,¬θi(~m), j) has an infinite path on which A does not
appear by Lemma 4.2.
(B⊕C⊕Xq) can recursively find all Φp such that Φp ≤Q Φq and adds no computations ap-
plying to any X ∈ Xq. Also for fixed θi, ~m, j the question of whether T (Φp,¬θi(~m), j) has an
infinite path on which A does not appear can be decided by (B⊕C)(α+1) (as T (Φp,¬θi(~m), j)
at least one level of complexity lower than T (Φp, ψ, j)) and so (B ⊕C)(α+1) ⊕Xq suffices to
find such a Φp, θi, ~m and j and to construct a path Y in the tree, and so r = (Φp,X(Y )∪Xq)
is the condition we want.
Case 3: In the final case T (Φq, ψ, k) is infinite, but every path contains A. We claim that
q does not force ψ, because if q Q ψ, then by Lemma 4.2, Xq forms a branch of T (Φq, ψ, k)
not containing A. As ψ is a universal sentence and q does not force it, there is some p ≤Q q,
some conjunct θi(~u) and some tuple ~m such that for every p
′ ≤Q p, p′ does not force θi(~m).
Therefore, p  ¬θi(~m).
For such an p there is a j such that T (Φp,¬θi(~m), j) has a path Y on which A does not
appear, and so by Corollary 4.4 (B ⊕C)(α+1) can find such a Φp, θi, ~m and then construct a
path Y , so then, the condition we want is r = (Φp,Xq ∪X(Y )).
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The reader may be wondering why we are proving theorems which are the analogues of
theorems which prevent us from adding A to the infinite part of a P condition, when all
Q conditions have that built in. It is, in fact, the bounds on the complexity of the forcing
relation that we want. These bounds will allow us to diagonalize against computing D.
Definition 4.6 ((Q, B ⊕ C)-Essential to splits). Let Φ0 be a finite use-monotone Turing
functional which correctly computes B on input A, and 〈e, α〉 a (B ⊕ C)-hyperarithmetic
reduction. For each τ , a finite sequence of binary strings of the same length, we say τ is
(Q, B ⊕C)-essential to 〈e, α〉-splits below Φ0 if whenever q, r ≤Q (Φ0, ∅) form an 〈e, α〉-
split (i.e. there is an x such that q Q 〈e, α〉B⊕C⊕ΦG(x) ↓= k1, r Q 〈e, α〉B⊕C⊕ΦG(x) ↓= k2
and k1 6= k2) there is some new axiom 〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ Φq ∪ Φr but not in Φ0 such that σ is
compatible with some component of τ .
We let UQ,B⊕C(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k) denote the set of length k vectors τ which are (Q, B ⊕ C)-
essential to 〈e, α〉-splits below Φ0. As with UP,C(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k), this set can be considered as
a subtree of a recursively bounded recursive tree. We drop the Q and B ⊕ C decorations
wherever possible.
Lemma 4.7. Let Φ0 be a Turing functional which partially computes B on input A, 〈e, α〉
a B ⊕ C-hyperarithmetic reduction, and k a natural number.
• If X is a size k set such that (Φ0,X) ∈ Q, and no pair q, r ≤Q (Φ0,X) form an
〈e, α〉-split, then U(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k) has an infinite path on which A does not appear.
• If U(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k) has an infinite path on which A does not appear, then each such path
Y is identified with a size k set X(Y ) such that (Φ0,X(Y )) ∈ Q has no 〈e, α〉-splits
below it.
Proof. The strategy is similar to that of Lemma 3.8, with the same modifications needed to
turn a proof of Lemma 3.3 into one of Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.8. If Φ0 is a Turing functional which partially computes B on input A, 〈e, α〉
a (B ⊕ C)-hyperarithmetic reduction, and k is a natural number, then U(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k) is
Πα+3(B ⊕ C), uniformly in the defining parameters. Furthermore if there exists a size k
set X, such that (Φ0,X) ∈ Q has no 〈e, α〉-splits below it, then we can find such an X not
containing A all of whose members are recursive in (B⊕C)(α+4) (it is also uniform, although
this is not needed).
Proof. The strategy is similar to that of Lemmas 3.9 and 3.10. Fix Φ0, k, 〈e, α〉 and τ . Then
τ ∈ U(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k) iff
(∀Φq,Φr ≤Q Φ0)(∀m,m1, m2)[(∃Xq, A /∈ Xq)((Φq,Xq)  〈e, α〉
(B⊕C⊕ΦG)(m) ↓= m1)
∧ (∃Xr, A /∈ Xr)((Φr,Xr)  〈e, α〉
(B⊕C⊕ΦG)(m) ↓= m2)
∧m1 6= m2)
→ (∃〈x, y, σ〉) such that 〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ (Φq ∪ Φr) \ Φ0
yet σ is compatible with some τ ∈ τ )]
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By Lemma 4.7 we can replace the existential quantifiers over reals by
(∃j)U(Φq, 〈e, α〉
(B⊕C⊕ΦG)(m) ↓= m1, j) has a path on which A does not appear.
(making the analogous changes for Φr). Now, the formula “〈e, α〉
(B⊕C⊕ΦG)(m) ↓= m1” can
be rendered as a Σrα+1(B ⊕ C) formula in our forcing language so, increasing its level by 1
to get a Πr(B ⊕ C) formula, and applying Lemma 4.3, the existential quantifier over reals
is equivalent to a (uniformly given) Π0α+2(B ⊕ C) tree having a path on which A does not
appear.
We can decided whether the tree has such a path by answering the question: Does there
exist a j and a node on a uniformly given Π0α+2(B ⊕ C) subtree of a recursively bounded
tree, the coordinates of which all disagree with A, above which the tree is infinite? Which
is a uniformly Σ0α+3(B ⊕ C) question.
This means we can express “τ is essential” as a formula with a prefix of universal quan-
tifiers, then a uniformly given Π0α+3(B⊕C) matrix, and so this property is Π
0
α+3(B⊕C), as
required.
So, to find a “simple” X, provided there is one, we need to be able to construct the
tree U(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k) and find paths on it, on which A does not appear. As U(Φ0, 〈e, α〉, k)
is a Π0α+3(B ⊕ C) subtree of a recursively bounded recursive tree (B ⊕ C)
(α+4) can decide
whether a given τ is on the tree and if so whether the tree is infinite above that node. It
can also decide whether the node has a coordinate which is an initial segment of A, and so
can construct a the desired path provided one exists.
Corollary 4.9. Let q ∈ Q be a forcing condition and 〈e, α〉 a (B⊕C)-hyperarithmetic reduc-
tion. Then we can find an extension r ∈ Q of q which diagonalizes against 〈e, α〉B⊕C⊕ΦG = D
i.e. p either forces 〈e, α〉B⊕C⊕ΦG is not total, or, there is an x such that it forces this com-
putation on x to be convergent, yet not equal to D(x).
Proof. The idea is the same as in Corollary 3.11. We assume there is a condition q which
forces totality and has no 〈e, α〉-splits. We then move to the related condition q′ which has
the same finite part as q, but the real parts are all recursive in (B⊕C)(α+4) as guaranteed by
Lemma 4.8. We then search for extensions of q′ forcing 〈e, α〉B⊕C⊕ΦG(x) ↓= y and output y
if we find it. We only need to search for conditions with new reals recursive in (B ⊕C)(α+1)
by Corollary 4.5. This makes the search hyperarithmetic in B ⊕ C, and so, if it computes
D, then B ⊕ C computes D, contrary to our hypothesis.
Corollary 4.10. The Σ2 theory of the arithmetic degrees in ≤,⊔ and 0 is decidable.
Proof. By Jockusch and Slaman, it suffices to establish the extended Posner-Robinson the-
orem. Choose representatives for each of the arithmetic degrees a,b, ci,di such that if i is a
hard case then A ≤T Ci.
One constructs a sequence (beginning with (∅, ∅)) of conditions (Φi,Xi) maintaining that
Φi partially computes B given A and that A /∈ Xi. Hence, our sequence will live in both
P and Q. We dovetail together all the Πrn formulas for n < ω, and relevant arithmetic
reductions against which we will diagonalize, and successively extend our sequence in the
corresponding notion of forcing (P for easy cases, Q for hard) deciding the next sentence, and
diagonalizing against the reductions. This ensures that forcing equals truth for all arithmetic
sentences of our forcing languages. By Corollary 3.6 and 3.10 we can do this for the easy
cases without adding A to the infinite part or incorrect axioms applying to A to the finite
part, as in the easy case A is not arithmetic in C.
Between these stages we add the axiom (n,B(n), α) for the least n so that there is no
axiom applying to A of this form, and α is the shortest initial segment of A permitted to
enter. As we are maintaining A /∈ Xi this is possible, and we never add any incorrect axioms
applying to A. This ensures that A⊕ ΦG ≥a B as required.
As we have diagonalized against each of the listed arithmetic reduction and forcing equals
truth for each arithmetic formula, we know for each index e and natural number n that
〈e, n〉Ci⊕ΦG 6= Di in the easy case, and 〈e, n〉B⊕Cj⊕ΦG 6= Dj in the hard case (this relies on the
observation that our algorithms in Corollaries 3.11 and 4.9 are arithmetic in the parameters
when α is finite). For avoiding the ideals below ei, we could do more forcing arguments. For
brevity though, we appeal to the fact that there are continuum many generics, even with
our coding of B.
5 Preserving ωCK1
To move the previous result to the hyperarithmetic setting we need to show that we can
also preserve ωCK1 relativised to C in the easy case, and B ⊕ C in the hard case. We use a
method suggested by Slaman: forcing over nonstandard models of ZFC.
Definition 5.1. Let M be an ω-model of ZFC. Then PM is the collection of all Kumabe-
Slaman conditions p = (Φp,Xp) ∈ P such that every real X ∈ Xp is in M. Because M
is an ω-model this definition is meaningful. Similarly QM is the restriction of the forcing
Q = QA,B to M. Extension is defined as for P and Q respectively. Note that PM ∈M for
any such M, and QM ∈M if A and B are also members of M.
Notation. Given a Kumabe-Slaman condition p = (Φp,Xp) ∈ P we call (Φp,Xp ∩ (2ω)M)
the restriction of p to M and denote it p ↾M.
5.1 Easy case
Suppose C ∈ c corresponds to an easy case and M is a countable ω-model of ZFC that
omits ωC1 and A but contains C. The existence of such a model is shown in [2].
Lemma 5.2. If (pi)
∞
i=0 is an M-generic sequence (i.e. the sequence meets all of the dense
subsets of PM that appear in M), then ΦG preserves ωC1 , that is to say, ω
C⊕ΦG
1 = ω
C
1 .
Proof. Suppose < is a well-order recursive in C⊕ΦG. AsM is an ω-model and the ordinals
of M[ΦG] are the same as that of M, then M[ΦG] is an ω-model containing C ⊕ ΦG and
is closed under Turing reduction. Consequently, M[ΦG] contains an isomorphic copy of <,
and as < is externally well-founded, it is well-founded in M[ΦG].
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Hence, M[ΦG] thinks < is isomorphic to an ordinal α, and as < is externally well-
founded, so too is α. However, the only externally well-founded ordinals inM[ΦG] are those
that are also externally well-founded ordinals in M, and by hypothesis, those are precisely
the ordinals less than ωC1 . Therefore, < has height less than ω
C
1 and so ω
C⊕ΦG
1 = ω
C
1 as
required.
Lemma 5.3. Suppose D ⊆ PM is dense, and also an element of M. Further suppose
p = (Φp,Xp) ∈ M is a forcing condition. Then we can find an extension q ∈ PM of p
meeting D such that q adds no new computations applying to A, and A is not in the infinite
part of q (as A /∈ M).
Proof. Suppose we can’t meet D below p without adding new computations to A. We will
show that D is not dense. Let τ be a finite sequence of finite binary strings all of the same
length. We say τ is essential to meeting D over Φp if for every condition r = (Φr,Xr) ∈ D
with r < (Φp, ∅), there is an axiom 〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ Φr\Φp with σ compatible with some component
of τ .
Let V (Φp,D, k) denote the set of τ of length k which are essential to meeting D over
Φp and note V (Φp,D, k) ∈ M for all k. Let k = |Xp| and enumerate Xp = (X1, . . . , Xk).
We claim τ l = (X1 ↾ l, . . . , Xk ↾ l, A ↾ l) ∈ V (Φp,D, k + 1) for each l. To see this, suppose
r = (Φr,Xr) ∈ PM properly extends (Φp, ∅) and meets D. If r has no new axioms applying
to any of X1, . . . , Xk, A, then r extends p, contradicting our hypothesis that we can’t meet
D below p without adding axioms about A. Hence, such an r has a new axiom 〈x, y, σ〉
applying to one of X1, . . . , Xk, A and so σ is compatible with the corresponding component
of τ l, showing τ l is essential.
Consequently, V (Φp,D, k + 1) is an infinite finitely-branching tree that is an element of
M. As M is an ω-model it sees that V (Φp,D, k+1) is infinite and finitely-branching, so by
Ko¨nig’s Lemma inside M, V (Φp,D, k + 1) has a branch Y in M. This branch corresponds
to reals X(Y ) which are also in M and so q = (Φp,Xp ∪X(Y )) ∈ PM and extends p.
As D is dense there is some extension r = (Φr,Xr) of q in D. Such an r extends (Φp, ∅)
so by the definition of essentiality, there is some axiom 〈x, y, σ〉 ∈ Φr \Φp with σ compatible
with some component of each element of Y . Therefore, σ is an initial segment of some
X ∈ X(Y ), but the axiom 〈x, y, σ〉 can only be in an extension of q = (Φp,Xp ∪ X(Y )) if
it was already in Φp, a contradiction. Therefore, q has no extensions in D and so D is not
dense.
5.2 Hard case
If A ≤h C, then we can’t omit A from ω-models of ZFC containing C. Consequently, we
can’t rely on the fact that A /∈ M to prevent us from adding A to the infinite part of a
condition. Indeed, if M contains A, then D = {p ∈ P : A ∈ Xp} is a dense subset of PM
which is also a member of M. Consequently, we have to use a different forcing.
Of course given what has come before, we want to use QM. Any ω-model which contains
C, must contain A in the hard case, and consequently, QM is an element of such a model
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iff B is. Therefore, in the hard case, we pick an ω-model M which contains C and B, yet
omits ωB⊕C1 , again this follows from [2].
Once one has such a model, the argument for any set forcing preserving the least omitted
ordinal (in this case ωB⊕C1 ) is the same as above. By definition of the forcing we need not
worry about interfering with our coding procedure.
5.3 The compatibility lemma
For a condition p = (Φp,Xp) in either of the restricted forcings PM and QM, it is still a
fact that no extension of p (in the relevant forcing) can add new axioms about members of
Xp. However, as the class of reals from which we can pick members of Xp from is highly
restricted, we want to know we can meet dense sets without adding axioms applying to reals
not appearing in the models (to ensure compatibility with the unrestricted forcings).
Lemma 5.4. Suppose C is an easy case, then for every countable ω-model of ZFC M omit-
ting ωC1 and A yet containing C, every finite set of reals X, every condition p = (Φp,Xp) ∈
PM, and every dense D ⊆ PM which is also an element of M, there is an extension r ∈ PM
of p meeting D which adds no new computations to any member of X.
On the other hand if C is a hard case, then for every countable ω-model of ZFC M
omitting ωB⊕C1 yet containing B and C (and, consequently, A), every finite set of reals
X not containing A, every condition q ∈ QM, and every dense D ⊆ QM which is also an
element ofM, there is an extension r ∈ QM of q meeting D which adds no new computations
to any member of X.
Proof. For the first claim fix such an M, an X, a p ∈ PM, and a D ∈ M. If any X ∈ X
is also an element of M, then the condition p′ = (Φp,Xp ∪ (X ∩M)) ∈ PM extends p and
can add no new computations. By the density of D we can meet D below p′ adding no
computations to any X ∈ X ∩M, so we assume that X is disjoint from M.
Now suppose that every extension of p in D adds a new axiom applying to some X ∈ X.
As in Lemma 5.3 consider the tree V (Φp,D, |X|) of essential τ of length |X|. By assumption
τ l = (X1 ↾ l, . . . , Xn ↾ l) is essential to meeting D below p (where X = {X1, . . .Xn}).
Consequently, V (Φp,D, |X|) is a finitely branching tree inM which is infinite. Hence, it has
a path Y in M corresponding to reals X(Y ) also in M.
We claim (Φp,X(Y )) has no extensions in D. If it did, such an r has a new axiom
compatible with some component of each member of Y . Consequently, r has a new axiom
applying to some X ∈ X(Y ) and so r can’t extend (Φp,X(Y )) a contradiction.
The proof for the second claim in the lemma is similar: as we are assuming X does not
contain A, we can still use the same trick as before to assume X is disjoint from M. The
proof from there is the same.
6 Bringing it all together
Fix representatives A ∈ a and B ∈ b. Then for each ci,di pair, pick representatives Ci and
Di, with the requirement that if i is a hard case, then A ≤T Ci. Then, for each easy case
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i, fix a countable ω-model Mi of ZFC containing Ci yet omitting ω
Ci
1 and A, and for each
hard case j, fix a countable ω-model Mj of ZFC containing B and Ci yet omitting ω
B⊕Ci
1 .
Now we need to show that we can construct a generic for all the forcings simultaneously.
We can’t construct a single generic sequence, because we may add a real X to the infinite
part at some point, where that X is not a member of someMi. To work around this we use
the Compatibility Lemma.
We will have one master sequence {(Φn,Xn)}∞n=0 which will live in P the unrestricted
forcing. We will maintain that A /∈ Xn, Φn partially computes B on input A and pn+1 ≤P pn.
These three conditions will guarantee that our sequence is also a descending sequence of Q
conditions. The master sequence will be used to decide all the sentences of the languages
Lrω1,ω(Ci) and L
r
ω1,ω
(B ⊕ Cj) for easy cases i and hard cases j. We will also diagonalize
against computing Di. This part is the same as the argument for the arithmetic degrees,
and Corollaries 3.6,4.5, 3.11 and 4.9 say we can build such a sequence.
To meet the dense sets in one of our ω-modelsMi, we consider the sequence of restricted
conditions (Φn,Xn) ↾ Mi. Certainly at some stage of the construction, we can extend the
condition (Φn,Xn) ↾ Mi in the corresponding forcing living in Mi to meet a dense set,
however, we can do better.
By lemma 5.4, we can extend (Φn,Xn) ↾ Mi in Mi to meet D, without adding any
axioms to A or any member of Xn, nor adding A to the infinite part. Call such an exten-
sion q = (Φq,Xq). Then we would define the next member of the master sequence to be
pn+1 = (Φq,Xq ∪Xpn). By hypothesis pn+1 ≤P pn, pn+1 partially computes B given A, and
doesn’t have A in the infinite part. Thus, we can continue coding, and have maintained our
invariants.
Thus, our master sequence (Φn,Xn) decides each sentence of each Lrω1,ω(Ci) and L
r
ω1,ω
(B⊕
Cj), and diagonalizes against every Ci or B ⊕ Cj-hyperarithmetic reduction, depending on
the case. The restricted sequence (Φn,Xn) ↾Mi isMi generic, and corresponds to the same
generic object as for the master sequence. Hence, ΦG preserves each ω
Ci
1 and ω
B⊕Cj
1 , which
completes the proof of the extended Posner-Robinson theorem.
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